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THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCING NATURE’S RIGHTS
UNDER ECUADOR’S CONSTITUTION: WHY THE 2008
ENVIRONMENTAL AMENDMENTS HAVE NO BITE
Mary Elizabeth Whittemore†
Abstract: In 2008, Ecuador became the first nation to give rights to nature when
it ratified constitutional amendments (new articles 71-74) that grant the environment the
inalienable right to exist, persist, and be respected. Environmentalists hope Ecuador’s
amendments will lead to improvement in a country devastated by resource exploitation,
and that other countries will follow. Yet, many wonder whether the amendments will be
enforced. This comment argues that—all things considered—successful execution of the
amendments is unlikely. Ecuador’s President has not demonstrated a sincere intention or
ability to implement the amendments. Further, plaintiffs who sue under the amendments
face significant legal barriers, such as Ecuador’s lack of a standing doctrine and a history
of judicial corruption and dysfunction. To counteract these problems, Ecuador should
grant lifetime tenure to its constitutional court judges, codify a standing doctrine, create
an independent enforcement body, and create an independent environmental tribunal with
criminal contempt power.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“We’re making history! Onward!” Ecuador’s President Rafael
Correa rejoiced in late September 2008.1 President Correa was celebrating
the news that voters had approved Ecuador’s new Constitution.2 He called
the vote a “historic victory” and promised that it would incite “rapid,
profound change” in Ecuador,3 an economically and politically fragile4
equatorial country on the Pacific coast of South America. This new
Constitution promises many new rights, but it has primarily caught
international attention because Ecuador is now the first nation in the world

†

J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2012. Many thanks to
Professor Gregory Hicks for his invaluable feedback, the staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for
their scrupulous editing, and her family for their patience and support.
1
Ecuadoreans
Back
New
Constitution,
BBC
NEWS
(Sept.
29,
2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7640704.stm.
2
Simon Romero, President Wins Support for Charter in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/world/americas/29ecuador.html.
3
New Ecuador Constitution Includes Gay Rights Guarantees, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 29,
2008), http://www.365gay.com/news/new-ecuador-constitution-includes-gay-rights-guarantees/.
4
WORLD BANK, OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, EVALUATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK
GROUP’S ACTIVITIES IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: BACKGROUND PAPER: ECUADOR COUNTRY CASE
STUDY 1-2 (2003).

660

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 3

to grant inalienable, substantive rights to nature.5
Other constitutions express commitment to environmental value, 6 but
an anthropocentric7 format is more typical. Ecuador, by contrast, now treats
the environment as a right-bearing entity alongside and equal to humans.
These provisions represent a shift in Ecuador (and perhaps Latin America
generally) from an exclusively anthropocentric view of environmental rights
to a more eco-centric view8 and have led some commentators to dub
Ecuador’s Constitution the “most progressive in the world.”9
Specifically, the new articles grant the environment the inalienable
right to exist, persist, regenerate, and be respected.10 They also guarantee
Ecuadorean citizens the right to sue for enforcement of these rights.11 Much
of the attention the provisions have received has been cautiously positive;
observers want to see how constitutional rights for nature may be
enforceable and in what types of legal proceedings.12 Will they have what
the legal community calls “teeth” in court? Will other countries follow?
It is significant that Ecuador is the first country in the world to codify
such novel constitutional mandates. Ecuador is home to at least eight groups
of indigenous peoples, over thirteen million hectares of tropical rain forest in
the Amazon basin,13 and the treasured Galápagos Islands. Unfortunately,
Ecuador is also home to an environmentally devastating oil industry that has

5
CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR, art. 56-60, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html#mozTocId64283 [hereinafter CONST.
ECUADOR].
6
Out of approximately 190 nations in the world, the constitutions of 117 mention protection of the
environment or natural resources. EARTH JUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 37 (2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/references/2005_
ENVIRONMENTAL_RIGHTS_REPORTrev.pdf.
7
An anthropocentric (or “homocentric”) format grants environmental rights to human beings. See
Carolyn Merchant, Environmental Ethics and Political Conflict: A View from California, 12 ENV. ETHICS
1, 52-57 (1990).
8
See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 164 (3d ed. 2010); Merchant, supra note 7, at 56; Myrl L. Duncan, The Rights of Nature:
Triumph for Holism or Pyrrhic Victory? 31 WASHBURN L. J. 61, 67 (1992).
9
See, e.g., Clare Kendall, A New Law of Nature, THEGUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 24, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/24/equador.conservation; cf. David Takacs, Note, The
Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L. J. 711, 730 (2008) (positing that South Africa’s Constitution may be the world’s most
progressive).
10
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71.
11
Id.
12
See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 9.
13
Judith Kimerling, Disregarding Environmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected
Natural Areas and Indigenous Homelands in the Ecuadorean Amazon, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 849, 849 (1991).
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caused vast deforestation in the Amazon,14 contaminated water, and rampant
illness.15 In sum, it is not difficult to say that no country needs this
amendment more than Ecuador.
However, it remains unclear whether President Correa intends to
implement these changes, or even has the resources necessary to do so. As
illustrated by the fact that President Correa is Ecuador’s eighth president in
ten years,16 the last few decades of Ecuador’s government is best
characterized by turmoil.17 The question of the amendments’ likelihood of
success therefore provides an opportunity to examine the chances of fair
environmental adjudication in Ecuador and its government’s practical ability
to implement change.
This comment examines the principal factors affecting Ecuador’s
ability to execute these unique amendments and argues that, all things
considered, successful execution of the environment provisions is unlikely in
Ecuador’s legal and political environment. Part II discusses the political
barriers that hinder execution of the environmental provisions of the new
Constitution—namely, a lack of government accountability and doubts about
President Correa’s intention and ability to implement his promises. Part III
addresses the legal barriers to implementation: procedural confusion over
standing and concerns with the structure and past corruption in Ecuador’s
constitutional court. Finally, Part IV suggests some ways that Ecuador could
counteract these political and legal barriers and improve the likelihood of
successful implementation. Specifically, Ecuador needs to award lifetime
tenure to its constitutional court judges, codify its standing doctrine, and
create of an independent body for enforcement of environmental court
rulings.
14
Ecuador’s deforestation rate is the highest in Latin America: it loses about 200,000 hectares per
year, and in 2009, it had less than half its original forest. See Daniel V. Ortega-Pacheco & Inés M.
Manzano-Torres, Institutional Change and Climate Policy in Ecuador 6 (2009) (forthcoming in
IMPLEMENTING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES (M.
Mehling, A. Merrill, & K. Upston-Hooper eds. 2011)).
15
Kimerling, supra note 13, at 849 (summarizing the contamination that resulted from Texaco’s
operations in the Amazon); see also Kendall, supra note 9 (describing the contamination as the
“Amazonian Chernobyl”). In February 2011, an Ecuadorean court ended a seventeen-year lawsuit when it
ordered Chevron to pay more than $9 billion in damages for polluting Ecuador’s Amazon jungle. Chevron
inherited the lawsuit when it acquired Texaco. Clifford Krauss & Simon Romero, Ecuador Judge Orders
Chevron
to
Pay
$9
Billion,
N.Y.
TIMES,
at
A4
(Feb.
14,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html?scp=2&sq=Texaco&st=cse.
16
Daniel Schweimler, Ecuador: New Hopes and Challenges, BBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6561961.stm; Simon Romero, Ecuador Vote: Leader Forges Middle
Road
Among
Leftists,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
28,
2006),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E4D7103EF93BA15752C1A9609C8B63&pagewante
d=all
17
See infra Part III.C.
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THE AMENDMENTS WILL REMAIN MERE LIP SERVICE UNTIL PRESIDENT
CORREA SHOWS A SINCERE ABILITY AND INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT
THEM

A major problem with Ecuador’s new environmental provisions is
the uncertainty over the executive’s ability and intention to implement them.
The turnover rate in Ecuador’s executive has been so high in recent years
that, as mentioned above, eight presidents have taken office in the span of a
decade.18 Therefore, an analysis of the new amendments’ chances of success
must properly account for the instability of the branch that created them.
The amendments were President Correa’s brainchild; he proposed the
new Constitution as part of his presidential campaign19 for “change.”20
However, the extreme volatility of Ecuador’s executive leaves the new
provisions vulnerable to neglect by current and future executives.
Considering Ecuador’s rapid presidential turnover in the past decade, it is
unclear how long President Correa will remain in office. It is likewise
unclear whether his successors will enforce the amendments, ignore them, or
annul them with another constitutional amendment. In this political climate
where constitutional amendments are commonplace21 and presidencies
fleeting, the success of the amendments in future executive administrations
hinges on their initial treatment by the current administration. However,
President Correa’s recent behavior contradicts his supposed good intentions
and implies that he lacks a sincere intention to implement the amendments.22
A.

Correa Has a Track Record of Choosing Profit Over Pachamama

How will President Correa implement his many promises and
simultaneously keep the country economically afloat? Although President
Correa has expressed support for the indigenous plaintiffs suing Texaco over
environment concerns,23 his actions in other arenas have been inconsistent
with the amendments, earning him a reputation as an “ambivalent

18

Schweimler, supra note 16; Romero, supra note 16.
Agustín Grijalva, Courts and Political Parties: The Politics of Constitutional Review in Ecuador
150 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburgh).
20
Catherine Conaghan & Carlos de la Torre, The Permanent Campaign of Rafael Correa: Making
Ecuador’s Plebiscitary Presidency, 13(3) PRESS/POLITICS 272, 278 (2008).
21
The 2008 Constitution is Ecuador’s twentieth. Jose Luis Cordeiro, Latin America: Constitution
Crazy,
LATIN
BUSINESS
CHRONICLE
(Oct.
6,
2008),
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=2799.
22
See infra Part II.B.1-2.
23
Nikolas Kozloff, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa: Copenhagen Climate Hero or Environmental Foe?,
http://www.sosyasuni.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=137&catid=1&Itemid=34.
19
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environmentalist.”24
President Correa has tough choices to make,
considering Ecuador’s economy survives mainly off its extractive industries.
In 2008, oil and mining comprised 26.8%—by far the biggest chunk—of
Ecuador’s GDP,25 so approximately one-third of Ecuador’s spending budget
comes from petroleum products.26 The country needs this income: almost
half its population lives below the poverty line.27 President Correa seems to
approach the role of extractive industries in the national economy with
pragmatism. In a 2009 radio address, he commented, “It is absurd that some
want to force us to remain like beggars sitting atop a bag of gold.”28
However, the same industries bringing Ecuador profit are also
polluting it—a situation that now violates the Constitution. Even some
environmentalists doubt the amendments can survive those economic
realities.29 This basic conflict begs the question of whether nature can truly
have rights in a country whose economy survives on nature’s exploitation.
1.

Correa’s Troubling Reaction to Constitutional Challenges to Mining
Foreshadows His Reaction to Constitutional Challenges Under the
New Environmental Amendments

President Correa’s reaction to a conflict between the interests of the
country’s mining industry30 and the constitutional “right to water” provides
an example of his duplicity.31
In January 2009, President Correa
backpedaled on the new “right to water” language by passing a new mining
law that opened up the country to large-scale metal mining by foreign
companies.32 The mining threatens indigenous water supplies and the “right
to water” held by indigenous communities who cannot survive without clean
24

Id.
Background Note: Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
(May 24, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35761.htm .
26
Kozloff, supra note 23.
27
The Associated Press, supra note 3.
28
Daniel Denvir, Resource Wars in Ecuador: Indigenous People Accuse President Rafael Correa of
Selling
out
to
Mining
Interests,
IN
THESE
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2009),
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/4252/resource_wars_in_ecuador/.
29
One commented, “It sounds great, but in practice, governments like Correa’s will argue that
funding his political project, which will bring ‘well being and relieve poverty,’ overrules the rights of
nature because the best technology will be used and mining and other extractive industries will be, of
course, sustainable.” Cyril Mychalejko, Ecuador’s Constitution Gives Rights to Nature, PHILADELPHIA
INDEP. MEDIA CENTER (Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.phillyimc.org/en/node/75055.
30
Oil and mining activities comprise 26.8% of Ecuador’s gross domestic product. U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, supra note 25.
31
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 66.
32
Paul Dosh & Nicole Kligerman, Correa vs. Social Movements: Showdown in Ecuador, 42 N.
AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA 5 (Sept./Oct. 2009), available at https://nacla.org/node/6094.
25
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water.33 Indigenous campesinos (peasant farmers) and groups like the
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (“CONAIE”34) are
outraged at Correa’s duplicity. Tens of thousands protested the passage of
the mining law.35
2.

President Correa’s Anti-NGO Response to the Protests Raises Doubt
as to the Sincerity of His Intention to Implement Nature’s Rights

President Correa’s response to the protests did nothing to dissipate the
conclusion that the new constitutional provisions are insincere or to narrow
the growing rift between the government, who initially supported the new
constitution, and social movements.36 Ignoring the protestors’ argument that
the mining violates the new constitution, President Correa pointed fingers at
the protestors, calling them “nobodies” and “extremists.”37 He also shut
down several organizations that participated in the protests. First, President
Correa moved to close down the Development Council of the Indigenous
Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (“CODENPE”), claiming its executive
secretary was misappropriating funds to her home province.38 Next,
President Correa undermined the National Directorate of Intercultural
Bilingual Education (“DINEIB”), which supported the anti-mining
movement by placing it under control of the Ministry of Education.39 The
proximity of these actions to the protests (one to two months) renders
President Correa’s motivations extremely suspect.40
President Correa’s administration also garnered international criticism
by shutting down Acción Ecológíca (“AE”),41 a leading non-governmental
organization (“NGO”) and one of Latin America’s best-known
33
Raúl Zibechi, Ecuador: The Logic of Development Clashes with Movements, AMERICAS PROGRAM
(March 17, 2009), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/ecuador-archives-49/1772-ecuador-the-logic-ofdevelopment-clashes-with-movements.
34
CONAIE is one of Latin America’s most powerful indigenous groups. Robert Andolina, The
Sovereign and Its Shadow: Constituent Assembly and Indigenous Movement in Ecuador, 4 J. LAT. AMER.
STUD. 35, 721–750 (2003), available at http://journals.cambridge.org.
35
Zibechi, supra note 33; see also Kozloff, supra note 23; Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.
36
These movements are now “increasingly disillusioned with the possibility that Correa represents a
continuation of neoliberal policy,” which President Correa’s campaign specifically promised to avoid.
Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.
37
Denvir, supra note 28; see also Kenneth P. Jameson, The Indigenous Movement and the Economic
Trajectory of Ecuador 23 (Univ. of Utah Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-05), available at
http://www.econ.utah.edu/activities/papers/2008_05.pdf (“…There have already been areas where the
Correa administration and Pachakutik have been at odds.”).
38
Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.
39
Id.
40
See generally Denvir, supra note 28.
41
“Environmental Action” is an NGO that since the 1980s has protested exploitation of oil, water,
and precious metals in Ecuador, as well as pollution and deforestation. Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.
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environmental groups,42 which supported the mining protests.43 The
government’s reasons for revoking AE’s legal status are still unclear:
initially, Ecuador’s Health Minister claimed that AE failed to fulfill its NGO
charter, but she later changed her story, saying that Ecuador simply wanted
to move AE’s registration to the new Ministry of Environment, which did
not exist when AE was founded.44 However, AE was given no advance
notice before being shut down, making it hard for most activists to believe
this was merely administrative streamlining.45 Whatever President Correa’s
real reasons, the revocation of AE’s legal status undermines confidence in
his intentions to implement the new environmental provisions, as shutting
down Latin America’s leading environmental organization is a move that is
fundamentally at odds with improving environmental protection. In sum,
friction over the mining law illuminates a critical limitation in the new
environmental provisions: they conflict with President Correa’s other
political and economic priorities.
III.

PROCEDURAL CONFUSION, TEXTUAL VAGUENESS, AND THE CHAOTIC
HISTORY OF ECUADOR’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL WILL HINDER
IMPLEMENTATION

Numerous legal barriers impede Ecuador’s implementation of its
environmental amendments. First, Ecuador lacks a clear standing doctrine.
It is unclear who may bring an action on its behalf, and what he or she must
prove to gain standing.46 This lack of a clear standing doctrine creates
fundamental uncertainty about the justiciability of claims under the
amendments.47
Second, the amendments are textually vague and
42
Daniel Denvir, Injustice in Ecuador: Ecuadorean Government Shuts Down Leading
Environmental
Group,
MANGROVE
ACTION
PROJECT
(Mar.
16,
2009),
http://mangroveactionproject.org/news/current_headlines/injustice-in-ecuador-ecuadorian-governmentshuts-down-leading-environmental-group/.
43
AE leader Ivonne Ramos released a statement calling the administrations’ actions arbitrary
censorship and likening them to an episode of authoritarianism “that is intolerable in a democratic regime.”
Denvir, supra note 42. Canadian author and activist Naomi Klein wrote an open letter to President Correa,
saying his actions resembled “something all too familiar: a state seemingly using its power to weaken
dissent.” Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.
44
Denvir, supra note 42.
45
Id.
46
Michelle P. Bassi, La Naturalez O Pacha Mama De Ecuador: What Doctrine Should Grant Trees
Standing, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 461, 464 (2009) (“Ecuador’s constitution is unclear about the requirements
for standing, and in fact, standing to enforce nature’s rights appears to be merely a constitutional
directive.”).
47
The exact concept of standing varies by country. See Angel R. Oquendo, The Solitude of Latin
America: The Struggle for Rights South of the Border, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 185, 217-218 (2008) (providing
general background on the different approaches to standing taken by different Latin American countries).
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inconsistent with other provisions. Finally, Ecuador’s constitutional court
has been politically comprised for decades;48 this judicial corruption will be
a hurdle to enforcement of the new provisions—even though the 2008
amendments aim to reverse these patterns.
A.

Ecuador’s Lack of a Useable Standing Doctrine Impedes
Implementation and Litigation of the Amendments

The procedural questions the amendments raise are not particularly
new—and neither is the idea that the environment should possess its own
rights.49 In 1972, Professor Christopher Stone published what has become
an iconic article, positing that nature should have standing in court.50 Nearly
forty years later, Stone’s article is now a book,51 and Ecuador is the first
country to try to prove his thesis workable. But procedural ambiguity stands
in the way of completely granting legal status to the environment. In this
way, Ecuador demonstrates what renowned environmentalist and law
professor Joseph Sax mused in 1971: “An essential question that must be
asked whenever proposals for an environmental declaration of rights are
raised, is whether those rights are going to be enforceable, and if so, by
whom.”52 In short, Ecuador’s standing doctrine—or lack thereof—is a
fundamental barrier to the enforceability of the amendments.
Ecuador’s Constitution and statutory law fail to clearly articulate its
standing doctrine.53 The absence of criteria for who may sue on the
environment’s behalf creates fundamental uncertainty about the justiciability
of claims under the amendments—and indicates doubt as to the
Constitution’s ability to serve as a source of real rights and remedies.
Currently, a citizen can have no idea how to establish him or herself as the
proper voice to sue on the environment’s behalf. This uncertainty critically
impairs citizens’ ability to sue for enforcement of the new provisions.
Consider an example: a multinational oil company has polluted an
Ecuadorean neighborhood’s water source. Outraged citizens prepare to sue
48

See infra Part III.C.1.
See, e.g., RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS (1989).
50
See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL L. REV. 450 (1972). Standing “is the authority of someone to initiate an
action.” STONE, supra note 8, at 35.
51
STONE, supra note 8.
52
JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 235 (1971).
53
Bassi, supra note 46, at 463 (“In a civil law legal system, where case law and judicial
interpretation do not create precedence, the standing doctrine is susceptible to changes through ensuing
legislation . . . Ecuador’s constitutional standing for the environment has yet to be codified or
litigated . . . .).
49
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for an injunction to enforce nature’s constitutional right to “persist and
exist.”54 How do they proceed?
The plaintiffs would first have to file an acción de amparo, a citizen’s
remedy expressly created by Ecuador’s Constitution55 for the judicial
protection of constitutional rights.56 The question of the proper plaintiff
under the new environmental provisions is a tricky one, because the plaintiff
in an amparo “must be precisely the injured or aggrieved person.”57 In other
words, the new Article 71 grants rights to nature, but trees, streams, and
animals cannot hire lawyers, appear in court, pay court fees, or collect
damages. The courtroom advocate must be a human, and that human must
have standing to bring the environmental claim.
Standing is a threshold issue in the adjudication of any constitutional
right. Hence, Ecuadorean plaintiffs suing to enforce nature’s rights under
the new environmental amendments must first know and meet the standing
requirements before they can get in the courtroom.58 Proof of standing in the
United States is usually difficult to achieve in environmental litigation
because it is often difficult to demonstrate the direct harm U.S. courts
require.59
Ecuador’s standing doctrine is a far cry from the enumerated standing
requirements under Article II of the United States Constitution.60 Because
Ecuador’s standing doctrine is not well developed,61 plaintiffs in Ecuador do
not know what they must show. The Ecuadorean amendments try and fail to
clarify standing, but to that end they only vaguely grant legal standing to
persons defending nature’s rights.62 This sweeping language does nothing to
clarify the requirements. What we do know is that in most cases, only the

54

CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71.
Id. at art. 88
56
See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN
AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS 153 (2009).
57
Id. at 181.
58
Id. at 181-83.
59
See Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Note, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric
Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615, 628 (2008).
60
In the United States, a plaintiff earns standing in federal court by showing “that (1) through breach
of a duty owed by defendant to it; (2) a plaintiff has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is a legally recognized
harm that is both (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical”’; (3) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant (‘causation’); (4)
it has to be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision (‘redressability’).” STONE, supra note 8, at 36 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Systems (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). Precise standing requirements often vary by statute.
61
Bassi, supra note 46, at 465 (“ . . . nature’s rights will be substantively litigated only after Ecuador
determines the contours of their standing doctrine . . . ”).
62
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71.
55
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injured party has standing to file the amparo,63 but the Constitution
nevertheless allows for the possibility for other persons to sue on the injured
party’s behalf in some cases. 64 This is of course the format that suits
brought under the new environmental provisions will require; since nature
cannot sue on its own behalf, humans must do it.
A crucial problem with humans acting as nature’s courtroom
representative is that Ecuador’s new Constitution omits any criteria as to
which of nature’s millions of potential representatives can earn standing.
The text merely states that “each person, community, neighborhood and
nationality shall have the power to enforce the rights before the public
authority.”65 Even accepting for a moment that any person really can bring
an amparo to enforce nature’s rights, plaintiffs still face the procedural
problem of knowing what they must prove in order to earn standing. Thus,
plaintiffs must litigate at the whim of judges with diverse environmental
viewpoints, who could toss their case for lack of standing at any point in the
litigation since the doctrine is undefined.66 Consequently, the mandate
granting rights to nature “appears to be merely a constitutional directive”
that is not self-executing.67 Until Ecuador clarifies the standing criteria,
plaintiffs will not be able to effectively sue, and nature’s new “rights” will
remain unenforceable.68
Countless other procedural questions remain unanswered. For
instance, the text provides no guidance as to which tribunal will handle the
environmental claims except to say that the “public authorities” can be
called upon to enforce nature’s rights.69 If the court awards damages, how is
the money judgment to be executed and to whom is it payable? Who will
pay for the legal representation and court fees? What are the contours of the
causation requirement for showing the root of the environmental damage at
issue?70 The new Constitution provides no answers, and these questions are
63

See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 56, at 183 n.328.
Id. at 186 n. 339.
65
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71 (“toda persona, comunidad, pueblo o nacionalidad
podrá exigir a la autoridad pública el cumplimiento de los derechos de la naturaleza”) (translation by
author).
66
See Bassi, supra note 46, at 465.
67
For a constitutional right to be enforceable, it must be either self-executing or the legislature must
directly enact legislation for its enforcement. See Bruckerhoff, supra note 59, at 627. A provision is selfexecuting if it is directly enforceable without supplemental legislation. See Neil A.F. Popovic, Pursuing
Environmental Justice with International Human Rights and State Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J.
338, 358 (1996).
68
Bassi, supra note 46, at 464.
69
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71.
70
The causation requirement becomes especially tricky when the claim concerns climate change, as
these claims create “daunting problems of proof.” STONE, supra note 8, at 50.
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beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, this lack of procedural clarity
renders the new rights meaningless until procedural criteria are clarified.
Without legislation or further clarification of Ecuador’s standing doctrine,
these constitutional “rights” will only exist in theory.
B.

Textual Vagueness and Internal Inconsistencies: What is “Nature,”
and What Happens When Rights Conflict?

Latin American Constitutions generally tend to be comprehensive and
use broad language, thus lending themselves to internal contradictions.71
This generality holds true for Ecuador in this instance, as its new
amendments conflict with other provisions of the Constitution.72 In addition
to a lack of procedural clarity, the new environmental amendments are also
textually vague. For one, the provisions define neither the entities they
purport to protect nor the extent of the protection.73 The text uses the terms
“la naturaleza” (nature) and “la Pacha Mama” (Mother Earth).74 These two
extremely broad concepts are likely to confuse courts and litigants alike,
especially since Ecuador has failed to define (or codify) their breadth. What
is a litigant to think?
An environmental litigant preparing to bring an amparo under the new
provisions could move to protect anything arguably characterized as
nature.75 In other words, one might presume that the drafters meant to
protect the colloquial aspects of nature that first spring to mind for many,
such as animals, plants and bodies of water. But these storybook images are
not the extent of nature. Literally and scientifically, the environment
includes less endearing entities like pests, viruses, bacteria, tornadoes, and
intangible entities like climate.76 Thus, the new Constitution, read literally,
grants all of these entities equal rights to “restoration,” as well as the right to
exist and regenerate.77
This broad grant of protection is impractical and destined to create
bizarre conflicts where natural ecological relationships become litigation
fodder. In the natural environment, organisms fight others for survival.
71
Patricio Navia and Julio Ríos-Figueroa, The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America,
38 COMPARATIVE POL. STUDIES 189, 193 (2005).
72
Compare CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71-74 with art. 12 and with art. 57.
73
Id. at art. 71-74.
74
Id.
75
The “environment” is defined as “the complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors (as
climate, soil, and living things) that act upon an organism or an ecological community and ultimately
determinate its form and survival.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 188 (10th ed. 1995).
76
Id.
77
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71-72.
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Does Ecuador’s new Constitution mean that these competitors could wind
up in its courts? Consider what would happen if pests devoured an entire
crop of bananas. Bananas are a cash crop in Ecuador,78 so could one assume
their rights would trump those of the pests? The text provides no such rule.
Perhaps the drafters intentionally left these determinations to the courts, but
such determinations would be a blatant waste of time and resources for
Ecuador’s judiciary, which is notoriously inefficient as it is.79 In sum,
bizarre conflicts of interest could wind up in Ecuador’s tribunals without
further clarification of just what the drafters meant by “nature.” Until this
clarification occurs, the provision cannot achieve the drafters’ aims, and
environmental plaintiffs cannot act on nature’s “rights.”
The potential for internal conflict extends beyond the animal
kingdom: what happens when nature’s constitutional rights conflict with
humans’ constitutional rights? Consider again the scenario of the pests
destroying the bananas. If the banana farmer destroys the pests, he would be
in violation of the constitution for denying the pest its Article 71 right to
exist.80 However, the farmer could argue that under Article 12, all
Ecuadoreans have the constitutional right to “safe, permanent access to
healthy, adequate and nutritional food, preferably produced locally and in
keeping with their cultural identities and traditions.”81 Assuming for the
sake of the exercise that bananas satisfy the local, healthy and traditional
criteria, what could result under the new Constitution? The lack of clarity
regarding the hierarchy of rights the drafters intended is currently a blockade
to effective litigation of nature’s rights. The Constitution provides no
answer as to whether human rights trump nature’s rights.82 Without this
clarity, Article 71’s grant of rights to the environment will have no bite in
court.

78

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 30.
Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development 11 (The Chicago Working Paper
Series, John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper, No. 287, 2006), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=892030.
80
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71.
81
Id. at art. 13.
82
Additionally, the new constitution grants indigenous communities several rights that potentially
conflict with the environment’s Article 71 rights. For example, Article 57 grants indigenous peoples the
right to manage their community lands. CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 57. Management is left
undefined, and thus could mean, in some cases, partial destruction, as communities need raw materials for
shelter and plants and animals for consumption. As with the banana scenario, this indigenous activity
would technically impinge on nature’s Article 71 rights. And as with those scenarios, the constitutional
text provides no insight as to the priority such rights should take.
79
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A Long History of Corruption in Ecuador’s Constitutional Court Will
Be a Hurdle for Environmental Plaintiffs, but President Correa’s New
Court Could Potentially Reverse These Patterns

In addition to textual and procedural vagueness, Ecuador’s judicial
dysfunction poses another challenge to enforcement of the new
constitutional provisions.83 As positive as the new provisions seem, they can
only have practical bite if Ecuador’s tribunals possess legitimate power to
rule on claims brought under them. As one scholar summarized, “A sound
judiciary is the key to enforcement… no degree of improvement in
substantive law…will bring the rule of law to a country that does not have
effective enforcement.”84 Effective enforcement is critical for environmental
plaintiffs because plaintiffs in Ecuador are barred from bringing an amparo
action against judicial decisions.85 The court’s decision, whether right or
wrong, is the end of the road—a scary reality considering the amount of
political entrenchment present in the court’s past decisions.86
The history of Ecuador’s constitutional court shows that effective
enforcement of constitutional rights was virtually impossible until very
recently.87 A historical account demonstrates the chaos and political
manipulation that has pervaded Ecuador’s constitutional court (“CC”).88 Its
long history of abuse by the executive and legislative branches will be a
hurdle to the enforcement of these new environmental provisions—even
though the 2008 amendments aim to reverse these patterns.
1.

Institutionalized Corruption in Ecuador’s Constitutional Court Will
Likely Forestall Meaningful Litigation of Environmental Claims

Ecuador’s new Constitutional amendments carry with them a legacy
of corruption and chaos that began in the nineteenth century. An overview
of this history illuminates the fragility of new Constitutional provisions and
the tendency of the government to ignore the Constitution altogether.
Because of this lack of judicial independence, environmental plaintiffs
should expect that resolution of their claims will turn on politics, not merit. 89
83

See generally Grijalva, supra note 19.
Dam, supra note 79, at 1.
85
See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 56, at 323-24 (citing PESANTES, supra note 63, at 84).
86
See Part II.C.1.
87
See generally Grijalva, supra note 19.
88
Id.
89
TGC case law shows that Ecuador’s constitutional court lacked judicial independence until 2007
(and even after the recent amendments, independence is far from certain). A 2001 economic policy case
regarding a value added tax (“VAT case”) proposal reveals that TGC judges often voted blindly along party
84
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Until 1945, Ecuadorean citizens had no action, institution or
mechanism to bring a claim that a law violated the Constitution.90 No
separate constitutional court existed as it does now; Ecuador’s Congress
itself conducted constitutional review.91 The 1906 Constitution even
formalized that only Congress could declare a law unconstitutional.92
Finally, in 1945, the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (“TGC”) was
formed.93 The TGC was a Constitutional tribunal outside the judiciary, and
thus a completely separate court from Ecuador’s Supreme Court.94 The
TGC’s power was limited. It could review Congressional proposals a priori
but Congress had the final word on a law’s constitutionality.95 Thus, the
TGC’s authority was limited to making observations about constitutionality
and suspending the law until Congress could decide the issue.96 Real power
to render binding decisions remained with Congress, and the Court
functioned more as an “administrative court that exercised control over the
executive [branch rather] than a court [that performed] constitutional review

lines, and not by the merits. TC ruling 126-2001-TP; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 119. In 2001, President
Gustavo Noboa proposed a tax reform that, among other things, would have increased the value added tax
(“VAT”) from twelve to fifteen percent. Id. at 118. The proposal received vehement opposition in Congress
from parties on both the right and left. Id. The proposal went to Congress in March 2001, and when
Congress overturned it, Noboa vetoed Congress’s decision, edited the proposal, and sent it back proposing
a smaller increase. Id. This time, Congress failed to reach the two-third majority that the Constitution
required to override a presidential veto. CONST. ECUADOR (1998), art. 153, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98.html [hereinafter CONST. ECUADOR (1998)];
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 119. The president’s proposal therefore became law after thirty days, as the
Constitution required. CONST. ECUADOR (1998), supra note 89, at art. 155, 156; Grijalva, supra note 19, at
119. The opposition challenged the proposal’s constitutionality before the TGC, which held the VAT
increase unconstitutional in a five-four decision. Grijalva, supra note 19, at 120. The TC made the wrong
decision, as Ecuador’s Congress never reached a two-thirds majority required to override the presidential
veto. Significantly, every TGC member in the majority was publicly linked to parties who opposed
Noboa’s administration and the VAT. Id. The dissenting TGC members were all publicly linked to progovernment parties. The court’s vote did not follow ideological lines: if it had, the members linked to the
ID and PSE who voted with the majority would have instead voted with the dissent (which would then have
been the majority), because those parties sit left of center on the political spectrum and tend to favor tax
hikes for “social redistributive purposes.” Id. This outcome proves that partisan loyalties dictated a critical
constitutional ruling. Indeed, the majority gained a definitive advantage in voting with Congress and
against the president: they avoided impeachment by the legislature. Id. at 122.
90
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 28.
91
Id.
92
CONSTITUTION OF
ECUADOR
(1906) Provisions 6 & 7, available at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/constitucion-de-1906-del-ecuador. These provisions were reiterated
in all Ecuadorean Constitutions until the 1992 reform. Grijalva, supra note 19, at 28.
93
The TGC’s name changed to the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitutionál) (“TC”) in
2006. Grijalva, supra note 19, at 20.
94
The TC’s independence from the Court is a strength of Ecuador’s judiciary. Navia & RíosFigueroa, supra note 71, at 196-97.
95
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 33.
96
Id. at 30, 42 n.28.
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of legislation enacted by Congress.”97
Despite several amendments between 1946 and 1992, the Court’s
power and existence remained under the thumb of Congress and the
President.98 Just one year after the TGC’s founding, the President discarded
the 1945 Constitution and wrote a new one that did not include the TGC—
simply because he was unhappy with the restraints the TGC imposed on the
executive branch.99 Just like that, the Court was gone, and Congress—the
branch that passed the laws—was put in charge of deciding whether laws
violated the constitution.100 The 1967 amendments resurrected the TGC, but
its power was still limited to formulating observations about the
constitutionality of laws and decrees.101
The Court’s decisional
independence from other branches of government withered away: it became
merely an “‘extended sub-committee’ of Congress.”102 In 1983, the TGC
finally received the power to suspend unconstitutional laws,103 but even as
late as 1992, Congress retained general power to determine the meaning of
unconstitutional provisions104 (which is, paradoxically, a power necessary
for the TGC to perform constitutional review). This lack of judicial
independence begs the conclusion that environmental rights105 stood little
chance of enforcement under these past constitutions.
Progress seemed to arrive in 1996, when the TGC became the
Tribunal Constitutional (“TC”), and the Court earned the power “of final say
for constitutional review.”106 The Court now had power to rule with finality
on constitutional rights, although formally, Congress remained the “ultimate
interpreter of the constitution.”107 Until these reforms, a citizen’s only
recourse for constitutional violations was a claim (queja) over which the
TGC could merely “make observations.”108 The 1996 Constitution also
created the writ of amparo, an individual “legal action to immediately
97

Id. at 27.
Id. at 32, 33, 39, 42.
Id. at 32.
100
Id. at 33.
101
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 33.
102
Id. at 39.
103
Id.
104
CONSTITUTION
OF
ECUADOR
(1978),
Provisions
141-42,
available
at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/constitucion-de-1978-del-ecuador-codificada-en-1984;
Grijalva,
supra note 19, at 39, n. 26.
105
At this point, constitutional environmental rights did not extend to the environment itself; rather,
humans enjoyed the right to a “healthy environment.” See Erin Daly & James R. May, Vindicating
Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 11 ORE. REV. INTL. L. 265, 395 (2009).
106
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 42.
107
Id.
108
Id at 42 n. 28.
98
99
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suspend authorities’ actions when a constitution right is being violated.”109
Things were improving. These reforms changed the way a citizen could
request constitutional review by the Court. Under Provision 277, groups of
at least one thousand citizens could request constitutional review.110 An
individual citizen could also challenge a law, but the Constitution required
him to first obtain a positive opinion declaration111 from an Ombudsman112
before he could take his case before the TC.113 Furthermore, the 1998
reforms continued to expand the TC’s power by requiring the legislature to
follow mandatory impeachment procedures before removing TC members
from the court.114 Together, the 1996 and 1998 reforms gave the Court “a
wider set of tools [for] constitutional control.”115 It seemed that Ecuador had
finally created an independent constitutional judiciary, as TC decisions were
final and Congress had no right to review them.116 Under this scheme,
environmental claims would seem to stand a chance of fair adjudication.
In reality, however, political manipulation of the TC continued even
after the 1996 and 1998 reforms. After 1997, Ecuador’s political scene was
“characterized by almost continuous presidential crisis.”117 As a result of the
chaos, the TC became “a sort of additional legislative arena,” and, “political
parties permanently looked for influence or control over TC judges.”118
Between 1996 and 2007, no TC or individual Justice completed the
constitutionally mandated four-year term.119 The inter-branch tension was
such that three Presidents were unconstitutionally removed from office
between 1997 and 2005,120 and five constitutional tribunals were
unconstitutionally removed. 121 After one such removal, new TC members
109

Id.
CONST. ECUADOR (1998), supra note 89, Art. 277; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 66.
111
A “positive opinion” is one where the Ombudsman found the challenge adequate in that it
established at least the formal requirements. This opinion could contain information about the plaintiff and
the law or norm that the plaintiff was challenging. Grijalva, supra note 19, at 66, 88.
112
In Ecuador, as in many other Latin American countries, the Ombudsman functions independently
from the government and represents citizen rights, not government interests. Grijalva, supra note 19, at 88.
While the Attorney General represents the interests of the government, the Ombudsman possesses the
political power to both denounce human rights violations and initiate legal actions, like amparo and habeas
corpus, before the Supreme Court or TC. Id. at 72.
113
CONST. ECUADOR (1998), supra note 89, at art. 277; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 66.
114
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 48.
115
Id. at 47.
116
Id. at 48.
117
Id. at 49
118
Id.
119
Santiago Basabe-Serrano & John Polga-Hecimovich, Legislative Coalitions and Judicial Turnover
in Ecuador’s Constitutional Court (1999-2007), www.flacso.org.ec/docs/doctrabpp_basabe3.pdf.
120
Conaghan, supra note 20, at 271.
121
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 25, 36, 49, 51 (t. 2-4).
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were not appointed for eleven months, during which time the court simply
ceased to function.122
In sum, chaos and fragmentation characterized Ecuador’s
constitutional court until just four years ago when President Rafael Correa
took office in January 2007 as Ecuador’s eighth president in ten years.123
Infrastructural problems have made the TC “vulnerable and unstable,”124
rendering it utterly unreliable for plaintiffs with constitutional grievances.
These factors have eroded judicial independence in Ecuador during this
period.125 The Court’s inconsistent existence and powers of constitutional
review suggest that the environmental rights provisions introduced in
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution would stand little chance of meaningful
enforcement in this judicial scheme. What should have been Ecuador’s most
competent constitutional court became ensnared in conflicts with the
executive and legislative branches.126 The TC lacked legitimate authority to
make binding constitutional rulings, and judges were political marionettes.127
During this period of turmoil, plaintiffs could not rely on the court’s
existence or independence—let alone its power to issue a binding judgment
safe from Congress’s reversal.128 This account serves as a caution to
environmental plaintiffs that their claims in all likelihood would turn more
on political loyalties than legal merit.129
122

Id. at 60.
Id. at 49; Romero, supra note 18; Schweimler, supra note 16.
124
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 44.
125
Id. at 61.
126
Conaghan, supra note 20, at 271; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 25, 36, 49, 51 (t. 2-4).
127
Appointments of TC members “served as patronage to be distributed among the government’s
new allies in exchange for congressional support to avoid impeachments, passing legislation or
implementing policy.” Grijalva, supra note 19, at 26. Studies demonstrate that between 1979 and 1998
judicial posts served as “discretionary collation payoffs available to Ecuadorean Presidents.” Id. at 63.
128
CONST. ECUADOR (1906), supra note 92; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 27, 30, 32, 33, 39 n.26, 42
n.28.
129
Two TGC decisions cut against the argument that the TGC lacked the ability to fairly adjudicate
environmental claims during this period. In Fundación Natura v. Petro Ecuador, the Court relied on
Ecuadoreans’ right to a healthy environment in upholding a civil verdict that Petro Ecuador’s production of
leaded fuel violated Ecuador’s federal law. See May & Daly, supra note 105, at 395 (citing Case Nos.
377/90, 378/90, 379/90, 380/90 combined, Fundacion Natura v. Petro Ecuador, Tribunal of Constitutional
Guarantees, Resolution No. 230-92-CP, Oct. 15, 1992 (Ecuador)). In Arco Iris v. Instituto Ecuatoriano de
Mineria, the TGC examined environmental degradation occurring in Podocarpus National Park in Southern
Ecuador. The court concluded that the company’s mining and road building operations in the park were “a
threat to the environmental human right of the inhabitants of the provinces of Loja and Zamora Chinchipe
to have an area which ensures the natural and continuous provision of water, air humidity, oxygenation and
recreation.” See May and Daly, supra note 105, at 395 (citing Case No. 224/90, Arco Iris v. Instituto
Ecuatoriano de Mineria, Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, Judgment No. 054-93-CP, translated from
Environmental Law Institute, U.N. Env’t Program [UNEP], Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving
Force to Fundamental Principles in Africa 26 (2007)). These cases were environmental victories, and thus
seem to undermine the conclusion that the court lacked independence during this period. However, it is
123
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Under the Correa Administration, Environmental Claims May Now
Stand a Chance of Fair Adjudication

Despite the past dysfunction in Ecuador’s judiciary, a strong argument
exists that President Correa’s changes would force Ecuador’s constitutional
tribunal to function more independently from the other branches of
government.130 If this happens, environmental claims brought under the new
amendments would receive fairer adjudication than they would have under
previous reforms. The 2008 Constitution significantly changed the format of
constitutional adjudication in Ecuador,131 and may increase the chances that
Ecuador’s courts will be able to meaningfully enforce the new
environmental mandates. Others argue that the changes make Ecuador’s
constitutional tribunal more dependent on the President132—and thus
represent no real improvement.
Structural changes to the Court seem to improve access to justice.
The 2008 Constitution, which replaced the TC with the Constitutional Court
(“CC”),133 allows ordinary citizens to file cases directly with the court
(instead of relying on the Ombudsman’s134 approval, as required in the
past).135 A third of the CC will be replaced every three years,136 and
appointments are now merit-based.137 The CC enjoys more power and
independence than the Court ever did in the past it is finally “completely
clear” that the CC is “the only final interpreter of the constitution, and this
interpretation cannot be overruled by the legislature.”138 Therefore judicial
independence is more plausible under the 2008 reforms than under past
unclear whether the court would come out the same way as it did in Arco Iris when faced with a suit that
did not concern federally protected parkland.
130
See Roque Planas, Ecuador Divided Over Correa’s Referendum, AMERICAS SOCIETY/COUNCIL OF
AMERICAS
(Feb.
23,
2011),
http://www.asTHE
coa.org/articles/3040/Ecuador_Divided_over_Correas_Referendum/ (discussing a referendum proposed by
Correa that would help combat corruption in the judiciary).
131
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 158.
132
Id.
133
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 429-440.
134
In Ecuador, as in many Latin American countries, the Ombudsman functions independently from
the government and represents citizen rights, not government interests. Grijalva, supra note 19, at 88.
While the Attorney General represents the interests of the government, the Ombudsman possesses the
political power to both denounce human rights violation and initiate legal actions, like amparo and habeas
corpus. Id. at 72.
135
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2009 Human Rights
Report: Ecuador (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136111.htm (last visited
February 21, 2011).
136
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 432.
137
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 158. Critics of this new format, however, note that the new
appointment procedure for the CC allows the government to easily appoint the CC majority. Id.
138
Id.
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constitutions, so environmental claims are more likely to receive fair
adjudication. If this turns out to be accurate, it follows that the
environmental provisions would carry more meaning and boast a higher
chance of success.
2.

Recent Case Law Suggests That Ecuador’s Constitutional Court May
Now Be Capable of Independent Adjudication of Environmental
Claims

A recent CC decision proves that successful environmental litigation
might now be possible. In December 2008, just a few months after the
amendments passed, the CC ruled139 on an environmental case that began a
year before President Correa took office and two years before the new
Constitution was passed.140 In November 2006, Ecuador’s Ministry of the
Environment authorized construction of a new dam project.141 If completed,
the Baba Dam Project (a series of dikes, dams and canals) would stretch
from Quito to Guayaquil.142 A reservoir dam would be built alongside a
hydroelectric generating plant, which would create a flood zone of 2,500
acres143—thereby displacing several hundred people in the Los Rios
province, including two indigenous communities.144
Downstream,
thousands could lose their fisheries and farms for lack of water. Riverside
communities face an increased risk of malaria,145 poor water quality and
water shortages.146 The project would also destroy the habitat of several
endangered animal species and more than twenty endemic plant species.147
Despite these threats, Ecuador’s Ministry of Environment granted the project
a license to proceed in November 2006.148 Soon thereafter, Ecuadorean non139
Resolution No. 1212-2007-RA, http://www.aida-americas.org/sites/default/files/Fallo%20
BABA_12_2008.pdf
140
Since this case began before the new environmental provisions took effect, the plaintiffs could not
utilize the new provisions in their argument. However, the case nevertheless demonstrates improved
independence in the judiciary, and thus supports this comment’s conclusion that the new environmental
provisions probably face increase chances of success under President Correa’s new Constitutional scheme
than under previous conditions.
141
Constitutional Court Orders Change in Environmental License for Baba Dam, Ecuador, FIAN
(Jan.
8,
2009),
http://www.fian.org/news/press-releases/constitutional-court-orders-change-inenvironmental-licence-for-baba-dam-ecuador [hereinafter Constitutional Court Orders Change].
142
A River in Peril: The Baba Dam Project, AIDA (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.aidaamericas.org/en/project/babadam [hereinafter A River in Peril].
143
Constitutional Court Orders Change, supra note 141.
144
A River in Peril, supra note 142.
145
Victories in Chile, Ecuador and Russia, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE (June 13,
2007), http://www.elaw.org/node/690.
146
A River in Peril, supra note 142.
147
Resolution 1212-2007-RA, supra note 139; AIDA, supra note 142.
148
AIDA, supra note 142.

678

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 3

profit ECOLEX149 filed suit.
The initial judge rejected ECOLEX’s claims that the project violated
human rights to water, food, work, and a safe environment,150 and that the
project’s environmental impact assessments were incomplete, inaccurate,
and failed to meet national and international standards.151 ECOLEX
appealed to the CC.152 This time, international human rights organizations
submitted amicus briefs in support of ECOLEX; the briefs contained expert
conclusions that serious flaws in the studies assessing the risks the dam
posed to Ecuadorean biodiversity had contaminated the results.153 Unlike
the first judge, the CC concluded “the manner in which the Baba project had
been authorized and implemented constituted a violation of human rights,
including the rights to a healthy environment, to consultation and to citizen
participation.”154 The CC halted the project, ordered the Ministry of the
Environment to reevaluate the environmental impact statements and social
impact studies, and ordered the Attorney General to audit the procedures and
approval of the environmental impact evaluations.155 ECOLEX called the
decision “outstanding news,” and expects the ruling to serve as precedent for
other projects in Ecuador that affect environmental and human rights.156
The significance of the CC’s Baba Dam decision is complex, despite
ECOLEX’s optimism. On one hand, enforcement of the ruling is not secure:
the Ecuadorean government is moving forward with the project even though
the court-ordered revisions are not complete, and an audit by the
Comptroller’s Office showed that the project plans lacked measures to
mitigate environmental harm.157
As a result of the government’s
disobedience, ECOLEX has sought advice on strategies for ensuring the
CC’s ruling is actually enforced.158 However, ECOLEX faces an uphill
battle: although amparo laws in Ecuador ostensibly obligate a defendant to
obey a ruling, the amparo judges “do not have the power to directly impose

149

ECOLEX is an acronym for the Corporación de Gestión y Derecho Ambiental, an Ecuadorean
NGO with legal status to advocate for the rights of people and nature.
150
Because the plaintiffs filed suit in 2006 before nature received legal rights in the 2008
Constitution, the plaintiffs could not bring the claims under the new environmental provisions.
Nevertheless, the suit provides an opportunity to observe the CC’s reaction to environmental claims, since
the CC issued its ruling after the amendments passed.
151
FIAN, supra note 141.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
AIDA, supra note 142; see generally Resolution 1212-2007-RA, supra note 139.
155
FIAN, supra note 141.
156
Id.
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AIDA, supra note 142.
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Id.
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disciplinary or criminal sanctions [on] those that disobey their orders.”159
Instead, the interested party must seek out the initiation in the criminal
courts of a judicial criminal procedure against the disobedient party, which
in this case is the government.160
On the other hand, the CC’s decision represents a huge step forward in
its judicial independence. No data indicates that members voted based on
their political ties, and the CC reprimanded the government (the Ministry of
the Environment) by holding its procedures inefficient under the
constitution. In sum, the Baba Dam decision may mean the new CC will
finally serve as a fair forum for plaintiffs to bring their environmental
claims, even if enforcement issues remain unresolved.
3.

President Correa’s New Court is an Improvement, but Corruption
Continues to Threaten Objectivity

Despite this progress, grim realities persist, as a politically
compromised judiciary is not a plaintiff’s only problem. Even if judicial
independence has improved under the 2008 Constitution, external corruption
of Ecuador’s judiciary has not.161 A 2009 Human Rights Watch Report
concluded that, although the 2008 Constitution provided the Judicial Council
with more oversight powers over the judiciary as well as prosecutors and
private attorneys, “the judiciary continued to operate slowly162 and
inconsistently. There were lengthy delays before most cases came to
trial.”163 Another 2009 report by the U.S. State Department reported that
official corruption is “a serious problem” in Ecuador,164 and that the judges
often accepted bribes for favorable decisions.165 The Ecuadorean media has
often reported on judges “parceling out cases to outside lawyers who wrote
judicial sentences on cases before the court and sent them back to the
159

See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 56, at 395.
Id.
161
Ecuador is considered the second most corrupt Latin American nation, “with a level of corruption
rivaling that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sierra Leone and Uganda.” CLARE RIBANDO,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ECUADOR: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION AND U.S.
RELATIONS 3 (2005); see also John Alan Cohan, Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, the Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and Environmental Dispute
Resolution, 20 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 133, 160 (2001-2002).
162
A 2002 study found that the average commercial case in Ecuador takes eight years to reach
verdict. Dam, supra note 79, at 11. Similar cases in Colombia and Peru averaged less than one year before
reaching verdict. Id.
163
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 135.
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U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC, ENERGY, AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, 2009 Investment
Climate Statement: Ecuador (Feb. 2009), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2009/117668.htm.
165
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 135.
160

680

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 3

presiding judge for signature.”166
This problem is not new to Ecuador or Latin America in 2001, the
United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention released a study of
judicial corruption167 in Ecuador, Argentina and Venezuela that revealed high
frequency of both administrative168 and operational169 corruption in
Ecuador.170 According to a World Bank report, Ecuador’s percentile ranking
for “control of corruption” has declined steadily since 1998, which suggests
“that the political trajectory of the country is far from settled and that there
are fundamental underlying issues that the society must address.”171
The significance of this data in the context of the 2008 amendments is
that plaintiffs suing under constitutional provisions, such as the new
environmental provisions, face a huge hurdle to fair adjudication of their
claims, since “a vast majority of the population is not [financially] able to
offer illicit payoffs to government officials, even when they are willing to do
so.”172 This seems especially true for environmental plaintiffs, who are
likely to be non-profits and NGOs operating on shoe-string litigation
budgets. As a result, environmental plaintiffs, who are unwilling or unable
to “supply illicit incentives will be excluded from the provision of a ‘public
good’ (e.g., court services)” and constitutional mandates, and the
constitutional mandates will cease to hold practical meaning. In summary,
Ecuador’s history of judicial corruption and political entrenchment pose
serious hurdles for environmental plaintiffs. The above history suggests
plaintiffs cannot rely on the court system to enforce nature’s rights, and that
the provisions could remain lip service until Ecuador’s constitutional
tribunal proves it can function independently, reliably, and with integrity.
166

Id.
The directors of the study defined judicial corruption as “the use of public authority for the private
benefit of court personnel when this use undermines the rules and procedures to be applied in the provision
of court services.” Eduardo Buscaglia, An Analysis of Judicial Corruption and its Causes: An Objective
Governing-Based Approach, 21 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 233, 235 (2001).
168
Administrative corruption is corruption that “occurs when court administrative employees violate
formal or informal administrative procedures for their private benefit,” such as an administrative court
employee accepting a bribe to alter files or discovery material, delay a case by “illegally altering the order
in which the case is to be attended by the judge.” Buscaglia, supra note 167, at 235.
169
Operational corruption usually involves political schemes where considerable economic interests
are often at stake, such as a politically motivated court ruling or undue procedural change where the judge
making the change stands to gain financially. Id.
170
The sample in Ecuador was seven judges in seven pilot courts, 100 lawyers, and 200 firms who
brought cases before the pilot courts. Between 1991 and 1999, 15% of judges, 36% percent of lawyers, and
29% of firms reported first-hand knowledge of operational corruption. Administrative corruption was more
frequent: 24% of judges, 51% of lawyers, and 40% of firms reported it. Finally, 82% of judges reported
first hand knowledge of courts’ abuse of discretion. Buscaglia, supra note 167, at 237 Table 1.
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Jameson, supra note 37, at 4.
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO NON-ENFORCEMENT: ECUADOR’S CHANCES
OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION WILL INCREASE IF THE COUNTRY
IMPLEMENTS A NUMBER OF REFORMS

The world is watching to see how Ecuador will implement these novel
constitutional amendments. As detailed above, several obstacles hamper
implementation: 1) Ecuador’s lack of a standing doctrine; 2) the
amendments’ textual vagueness; 3) dysfunctional politics; 4) corruption and
manipulation of the judiciary; and 5) policy barriers like economic
instability and doubts regarding President Correa’s sincerity. This section
proposes some potential solutions to the above factors.173
First, Ecuador should grant its CC members life tenure. Permanent
office for CC members will increase the judiciary’s independence and boost
the chances of fair adjudication of environmental claims. Second, Ecuador
should codify an “open” standing doctrine to alleviate the procedural
confusion surrounding litigation of the amendments. Finally, Ecuador
should create an independent enforcement body and a specialized tribunal
with criminal contempt powers.
A.

Ecuador’s Constitutional Court Members Should Receive Lifetime
Tenure to Improve Judicial Independence and Increase the Chances of
Fair Adjudication of Environmental Claims

Among the above factors hampering the amendments’
implementation, the primary obstacle is Ecuador’s pattern of judicial
dysfunction.174 The judiciary’s functionality is acutely important to the
success of these amendments because environmental disputes so often carry
political and economic repercussions with the potential of sparking political
backlash.175 Courts assessing environmental claims often must weigh
competing policy interests that affect political agendas because fashioning a
remedy for a claimant often requires the court to choose between the
environmental interests at issue and the community’s present and future
economic and social interests.176 The stakes are particularly high in
environmental disputes: a plaintiff’s verdict can mean loss of political
173
It should be noted, however, that Ecuador’s political problems reflect years of turmoil, a political
solution to which is beyond the scope of this article.
174
See supra Part III.C.
175
May & Daly, supra note 105, at 425.
176
Environmental decisions “require a court to engage in significant policy decisions . . .[and] require
the allocation of resources toward one set of goals, invariably at the expense of other social needs . . .” Id.
at 428.
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station or, in some parts of the world, death for jurists and litigants alike.177
For example, in 2000, a former Ecuadorean Supreme Court Justice noted the
reasonable likelihood that the Ecuadorean military, which is funded by oil
revenues, would harass the Texaco plaintiffs if they brought suit in
Ecuador.178 Thus, lifetime tenure would allow the judiciary to decide cases
on the merits, rather than fears of political or personal ramifications.
1.

Lifetime Tenure Will Increase Judicial Independence and Improve the
Economy

As a general rule, where the judiciary is ineffective, advancements in
substantive law may make little difference.179 Furthermore, research shows
that independent judiciaries correlate with economic growth: strong
judiciaries lead to improved credit markets and the growth of both big and
small business because firms trust those courts to enforce agreements.180
Ecuador’s business sector currently distrusts the courts. Surveys reveal that
investment firms in Ecuador are “reluctant to switch suppliers, even if
offered a lower price, for fear [that] they could not turn to the courts” for
enforcement of their contracts.181 Thus, a stronger judiciary in Ecuador will
aid implementation of the new environmental provisions in two ways—by
allowing for more consistent application of substantive law and by
improving Ecuador’s economy so that the government has more money to
implement environmental protection programs, policies, and legislation.
The solution of granting CC members lifetime tenures therefore helps solve
the problem of how Ecuador can simultaneously protect natural resources
and sustain the economy.
As Alexander Hamilton182 stated, “nothing can contribute so much
to . . . firmness and independence as permanency in office.”183 Thus, to
improve the judiciary and increase judicial independence, Ecuador must
protect its CC Justices from executive and legislative impeachment by
granting lifetime tenure.184 Lifetime tenure is critical if Ecuador is to restore
stability and eliminate corruption from its judiciary. Plaintiffs must be able
bring constitutional claims before a fair and efficient judiciary that rules on
177

Id. at 433.
Cohan, supra note 161, at 161.
179
Dam, supra note 79, at 3.
180
Id. at 1-2.
181
Id. at 2.
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the case’s merits—not the politics of the moment. Throughout the CC’s
history, the length of members’ tenure has varied with different
constitutional amendments. Between 1945 and 1992, members served twoand four-year terms.185 Since 2008, CC justices have served nine-year
terms, and one-third of the CC is replaced every 3 years.186 Though nineyear terms are certainly an improvement, nine years are still insufficient, as
“experience has demonstrated that an independent judiciary rests on a
permanent corps of judges who can be removed only for cause.”187
The need for lifetime tenure is especially strong in developing
countries with historically weak judiciaries, like Ecuador.188 Lifetime tenure
cultivates judicial independence in these developing nations “because it
gives [judges] economic security and frees them from undesirable pressures,
whether from government, politicians, or private parties.”189 Thus, given the
history of political entrenchment in Ecuador’s judiciary (detailed above in
Part II.C.) this solution is especially appropriate. Such a reform would allow
CC Justices the freedom to eliminate all political influences from their
decisions without fear of financial, professional, or political repercussions.
Further, this job security would increase the prestige of Ecuador’s judiciary
by making it a more dependable career path. This increased prestige can in
turn increase the CC’s independence because “a judiciary without
independence is likely to lack prestige in the legal profession, and law
graduates may in turn avoid a career in a judiciary lacking independence.”190
Statistics of judicial dependence from other parts of Latin America
support this solution of lifetime tenure. In Peru, for example, President
Fujimori kept more than half the country’s judges on temporary appointment
between 1992 and 2002; not surprisingly, Peru’s judiciary is consistently
rated as the least independent in Latin America.191 Argentina’s situation is
not unlike Ecuador’s. Between 1946 and 1994, Argentina’s Court was
completely replaced six times by successive Presidents.192 Research shows
that this cycle contributed to Argentina’s decline from one of the world’s ten
wealthiest countries to one of the world’s poorest.193
185

Grijalva, supra note 19, at 31 (t. 2-1).
CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 432
Dam, supra note 79, at 23.
188
Id. (“Today a developing country, especially where political parties do not regularly alternate in
power, would be well advised to adopt procedures and practices, such as life tenure, that encourage judges
to be independent.”).
189
Dam, supra note 79, at 23.
190
Id. at 25.
191
Id. at 11.
192
Id. at 24.
193
Id. at 24 (citing Alston, Lee J. & Andrés A. Gallo, The Erosion of Checks and Balances in
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Criticisms of Lifetime Tenure Do Not Apply to Ecuador

Of course, the life tenure approach has its critics. Some argue that
appointments for life have often served as “an opportunity for patronage,” as
seen in the United States.194 Consequently, judicial appointments in the
United States often end up serving a political purpose, and Congress is more
likely to appoint new federal judges when the President’s party holds a
Congressional majority.195 Life tenure actually appears to counteract judicial
independence, the argument goes, because judges can become political
pawns for life.
However, patronage concerns are less likely to apply in Ecuador
because the country’s party system is so fragmented. Studies show that
between 1979 and 2004, Ecuador had the second most fragmented political
system in Latin American after Brazil,196 with some twenty-two political
parties jostling for power.197 During that period, the President’s political
party controlled, on average, only 26% of the legislative seats, and no
president ever held a congressional majority.198 This fragmentation means
that lifetime appointments pose little risk of patronage in Ecuador, since it is
unlikely that future presidents will hold enough power in Congress to
manipulate judicial appointments. In fact, the party system was so highly

Argentina and the Rise of Populism in Argentina: An Explanation for Argentina’s Economic Slide From the
Top Ten, (Univ. of Co. Institute of Behavior Science, Research Program on Pol. & Econ. Change, Working
Paper No. PEC2005-0001, 2005)). The fact that Argentina’s economy and judiciary declined in tandem
highlights the financial advantages of an independent judiciary. Research shows that judicial independence
correlates with economic growth because investors are more willing to spend money in a country where
they trust the judiciary will uphold their rights. Dam, supra note 79 at 3 (citing Jonathan Wheatley,
“Brazil’s Judicial Nightmare Brings Gridlock for Growth,” Financial Times, May 24, 2005). Further,
surveys show that investment firms in Ecuador “would be reluctant to switch suppliers, even if offered a
lower price, for fear they could not turn to the courts to enforce the agreement.” Dam, supra note 79, at 2.
Thus, since money Ecuador spends on its judiciary will ultimately improve its entire economy, Ecuador
should not hesitate to transition to a lifetime tenure appointment system and prohibit any decrease in
judges’ salaries. Salaries are a critical issue because top legal professionals will not seek appointment—and
the judiciary will therefore not gain prestige and independence—unless CC justices receive lifetime
appointment with fair salaries. Research shows that Mexico, for example, pays low judicial salaries,
pushing the most talented graduates toward more lucrative careers in private practice. See Robert Kossick,
The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 3, 742 (2004).
194
Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Supply, Demand and Life Tenure, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 580 (2005).
195
Id. (citing John M. De Figuiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J. L. & ECON. 435
(1996)).
196
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 20-21.
197
J. Andrés Mejía Acosta, Ghost Coalitions: Economic Reforms, Fragmented Legislatures and
Informal Institutions in Ecuador (1979-2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame).
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fragmented at the time President Correa took office that it is a virtual
certainty that he will not achieve a majority in Congress.199
B.

Ecuador Should Codify an “Open” Standing Doctrine to Give Effect
to the Amendments’ Purpose

As discussed above in Part III.C., a major obstacle for plaintiffs suing
under the new environmental provisions is that environmental rights, even
the most anthropocentric ones, are difficult to implement and enforce. The
absence of a clear standing doctrine in Ecuador makes this already difficult
task even more complicated. Before the new provisions can have bite,
Ecuador must codify standing guidelines upon which plaintiffs could rely. 200
1.

Codifying a Liberal, or “Open,” Standing Doctrine Will Reassure
Plaintiffs That Environmental Litigation Is Worth It

Standing doctrines are essential because they give procedural teeth to
substantive rights, hence creating procedural rights that promote the
transparency and accountability that are indispensable in effective
environmental governance.201
Without clear standing requirements,
plaintiffs could spend years on a lawsuit only to have a judge toss it out for
lack of standing. It is reasonable to conclude that few plaintiffs will take this
risk until Ecuador’s standing doctrine is less vague. Indeed, standing is
difficult for environmental plaintiffs in general,202 and even more so for
Ecuadorean plaintiffs suing under the new provisions, since they cannot
know what the provisions require them to prove. Additionally, Ecuador’s
new amendment is somewhat of a puzzle because the legal community has
little experience conceptualizing “how to enforce a right that is, by its very
definition, not connected to a human concern.”203 In short, Ecuador must
codify its standing doctrine before the amendments can mean anything.204
a.

Open standing would effectuate the amendments’ aims

To achieve the purpose of the amendments, Ecuador should codify an
open standing doctrine as opposed to a more restrictive doctrine that imposes
199
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201
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strict requirements on plaintiffs. An open standing doctrine will aid the
amendments’ enforcement because “the broader or more lenient the standing
requirements . . . the more likely that a constitutional right will be
enforced.”205 Under open standing, any individual could defend nature’s
rights, regardless of whether that plaintiff could demonstrate any direct
personal harm.206
An open standing doctrine makes the most sense for an amendment
that purports to grant a remedy to non-human entities. Under this doctrine,
plaintiffs would not be bound to the stringent standing requirements
employed by U.S. courts, as those requirements could not realize the aim of
providing a remedy to the environment itself. Thus, despite criticisms of an
open standing doctrine, which warn of frivolous claims and bad precedent,207
open standing would best implement the amendments’ aims.
In codifying “open” standing, Ecuador would be following in the
footsteps of countries that have already found success with such a doctrine
in the adjudication of environmental claims. For instance, the Supreme
Court of Chile held in a 1997 decision known as the Trillium case that the
Chilean government violated the country’s constitutional right to live in an
environment free from contamination when it approved a project allowing
270,000 hectares of forests to be logged.208 The Court granted standing to
the plaintiffs (individuals209 and environmental groups210) despite the fact
that none had suffered any personal injury, explaining that the constitutional
right to a clean environment was owed to all citizens.211 The Supreme Court
of Peru likewise granted open standing to a group of citizens in the
environmental case Proterra v. Ferroaleaciones San Ramon S.A in 1992. 212
India, South Africa, and the Philippines also grant liberal standing in
environmental cases.213
205

May & Daly, supra note 105, at 416.
Bassi, supra note 46, at 465.
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208
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Oliver A. Houck, A Case of Sustainable Development: The River God and the Forest at the End of
the World, 44 TULSA L. REV. 275, 307 (2008).
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Gideon Long, Saving Chile’s Southern Wilderness, BBC NEWS (Feb. 25, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7853076.stm.
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May & Daly, supra note 105, at 392-93. The benefit of Chile’s grant of open standing and
accepting the case was the preservation of some of the world’s last remaining cold-climate virgin forests.
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Ecuador should also adopt the “precautionary principle” as part of
its standing doctrine

Furthermore, Ecuador could strengthen the effect of the new
environmental provisions and help effect the meaning and aim of the
amendments by embracing the “precautionary principle.” The precautionary
principle holds that “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss
[to the environment], lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.”214 If
courts in Ecuador applied this principle, plaintiffs could earn standing even
if they could not demonstrate that tangible harm to the environment had
already occurred. This concept of precautionary standing is connected to the
concept of future generations. In other words, plaintiffs could sue before
harm occurs because an inability to do so would threaten the constitutional
rights to a safe environmental that the constitution grants future generations.
Furthermore, the fact that courts in other countries such as Hungary
and Pakistan already apply the precautionary principle to environmental
rights cases shows that courts properly apply the principle to “help head off
the problems associated with having to prove causation in environmental
rights cases.”215 Proving causation is often legally complex, timeconsuming, and expensive.216 Legal services agencies in developing
countries like Ecuador often lack the resources to do so because
environmental litigation is almost always scientifically and administratively
complex.217 In short, Ecuador’s ability to implement these new
environmental provisions would greatly improve if the legislature codified
guidelines for suits that included an explanation and requirement of the
precautionary principle.
C.

Given Problems with Both National and Local Implementation in
Developing Countries, Ecuador Should Create an Independent
Enforcement Body and a Specialized Tribunal

Another threshold issue is which organized body should lead
enforcement on the ground once the CC issues environmental rulings;
essentially, the question is whether national or local government should call
214
Bruckerhoff, supra note 59, at 643 (citing TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS 104 (2005)).
215
Bruckerhoff, supra note 59, at 644.
216
May & Daly, supra note 105, at 435
217
Id. at 417. Environmental litigation often involves all branches of government, plus a multitude of
private and public sector actors. Id. at 437.
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the shots. Unfortunately, the answer seems to be neither, as both local and
national implementation management will struggle in Ecuador because of its
weak legal and political systems. Ecuador should therefore implement an
independent body of enforcement.
1.

Neither Local Nor National Implementation Is Likely to Succeed
Because of Ecuador’s Fragile Political and Legal Structures

Research shows that environmental problems in developing countries
often stem from institutional problems,218 and Ecuador is no exception.
Research shows that Ecuador’s “weak tenurial regimes…induce a cycle of
excessive land clearing and inadequate resources conservation.”219 Although
national governments tend to efficiently tackle certain objectives, like
military organization and urban development, they often lack motivation to
spend the amount of money necessary to protect the environment.220 This
seems especially true in low-income nations like Ecuador, where debt is high
and poverty is rampant.221 Consequently, many scholars feel that the
“fences-and-lines” approach, where authority over natural resources falls to
central government, usually does not work in low-income countries.222
Ecuador might be the rare exception because President Correa may be
politically motivated to conserve resources since indigenous groups
comprise a large portion of his constituency.223 Nevertheless, “corrupt and
inefficient bureaucracies can undermine conservation on the ground.”224
Herein lies Ecuador’s problem: it has made big promises that are hard to
implement.
Unfortunately, local resource management may not be a solution
either. Current research shows that “most [communities] are probably too
218
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weak to resist the temptation to overuse their resources or to overcome
outsiders seeking to exploit or control the resources.225 In short, in much of
Latin America, both national and local government systems are weak and
undependable.226
2.

Ecuador Needs an Independent Enforcement Body to Implement the
Amendments and Prevent Future Corruption

Ecuador should implement an independent enforcement body,
separate from both national and local government, lead enforcement of the
amendments on the ground, and finally, bring the government into
compliance with its own constitution. An independent body is an
appropriate solution to the enforcement problem because the Ecuadorean
public distrusts the political system.227 Public opinion polls show that the
public has felt alienated from politics for the past decade: in three
successive audits, Ecuadoreans expressed a profound lack of confidence in
the ‘central nucleus’ of the political system: the national government,
congress, and political parties. Not surprisingly, the lack of confidence went
hand in hand with a widely shared view that politicians were corrupt.228
Since Ecuadoreans lack confidence in the political system’s ability to act on
its promises, an independent body would be the appropriate vehicle to
restore the public’s trust in government and to encourage plaintiffs to bring
environmental claims when they are warranted.
This independent body would need legal standing to trace a ruling
from the CC to the communities and to ensure that Ecuador adhered to the
CC’s mandates. The people comprising this body would need to possess a
professional background in environmental law and ideally constitutional law.
More importantly, they would need to lack any political affiliations that
would compromise their objectivity, in order to effectively enforce the CC’s
environmental rulings and avoid the entrenchment that corrupted the
judiciary.
This new body will increase the effectiveness of the
environmental provisions because Ecuadoreans will see that their lawsuits
225
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matter, have a lasting effect, and are not a waste of their time and money.
3.

Ecuador Should Create a Specialized Environmental Court with
Power of Criminal Contempt to Aid Enforcement

In light of Ecuador’s fickle judicial setting, Ecuador should create a
specialized environmental tribunal to implement the amendments. These
specialized courts could develop their own requirements for both standing
and the admission of evidence, both of which tend to cause problems for
plaintiffs for reasons discussed elsewhere in this comment.229 If staffed by
judges with environmental or scientific expertise, these tribunals could give
a more fair trial to parties on both sides of the litigation. Additionally, “with
added expertise, the courts would benefit from increased social legitimacy,
and would thereby have the power to issue broader, more creative orders to
remedy environmental violations.”230 A specialized court is also better able
to avoid the entrenchment and dysfunction characteristic of the
constitutional court; by deciding only environmental cases, the court would
dodge pressure from other branches of government that the constitutional
court must battle when deciding politically-charged cases.
To maximize its effectiveness, this court must have criminal contempt
power—or the power to impose criminal sanctions for violations of its
rulings. Criminal contempt is considered one of the most important features
of an injunctive relief system.231 In the United States, criminal contempt
power is part of what makes an injunction effective; the same court that
issues a ruling can also punish violations of that ruling with imprisonment or
fines.232 Amparo judges in Ecuador do not have this power,233 so disobedient
parties, like the government in the Baba Dam case, have no incentive to
obey a ruling because they face no sanctions. As Justice Brewer of the
United States Supreme Court said, to compel obedience, courts “must have
the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience…To submit the
question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court,
would operate to deprive the proceedings of half its efficiency.”234 In sum,
granting the power of criminal contempt to this independent environmental
court will give the amendments teeth because violators will actually have a
motivation to comply with court rulings.
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232
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CONCLUSION

Ecuador’s 2008 constitutional amendments may have accomplished
something historic. No other country has gone so far to protect the
environment. If the amendments are enforced, they could transform legal
treatment of the environment. Unfortunately, Ecuador’s President seems
more focused on the economy than the constitution.235 Additionally,
procedural confusion and half a century of political chaos mean that these
amendments will likely linger in the constitution without any real bite. This
comment argues that Ecuador’s amendments are more likely to have an
impact if Ecuador implements structural and procedural changes. These
changes may not take hold for several generations, if ever. Regardless,
Ecuador’s new Constitution paves the way for potentially transformative
environmental change in the future.
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See supra Part II.B.

